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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STANDING PARENTS OF
BLACK CHILDREN ATTENDING PUBLIC SCHOOLS UNDERGOING DESEGREGATION LACK STANDING TO CHALLENGE
ALLEGEDL Y INEFFECTIVE IRS PROCEDURES DESIGNED TO
LIMIT TAX-EXEMPT STATUS TO RACIALLY NONDISCRIMINATORY PRIVATE SCHOOLS. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315
(1984).
Parents of black Tennessee schoolchildren brought a class action
suit I alleging that Internal Revenue Service (IRS) procedures2 failed to
fulfill that agency's obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools. 3 The parents claimed that the IRS procedures
I. Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Wright v. Regan,
656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315
(1984).
In 1976, Inez Wright, the mother of four black children attending public school
in Memphis, Tennessee, and a number of similarly situated parents in other states
initiated the class action against the Secretary of the Treasury, G. William Miller,
later replaced by Donald T. Regan. Mr. Wayne Allen, chairman of a private
school, was later granted leave to intervene. The parents claimed that some racially
discriminatory private schools were improperly receiving federal tax-exempt status
because IRS procedures were inadequate to detect false certifications by the schools
of nondiscriminatory policies. The parents sought a court order requiring nationwide implementation by the IRS of new procedures designed to identify these
schools and to prevent all racially discriminatory schools from receiving tax-exempt
status. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3321 (1984). The parents alleged that the
existing IRS procedures violated several laws: 1.R.c. § 501(c)(3) (1982) (governing
the tax-exempt status of charitable organizations); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982); 42 U.S.c. § 1981 (1982); and, the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. [d. at 3322 n.12. The parents did not
claim injury as dissatisfied taxpayers protesting a tax expenditure. Rather, they
based their claim on constitutional and statutory injuries and unconstitutional subsidization of private discrimination as a result of government tax policies. [d. at
3323-24.
2. The IRS requires that all schools applying for tax-exempt status adopt a "racially
nondiscriminatory policy as to students." The IRS defines such a policy as meaning
that a school:
admits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges, programs, and
activities generally accorded or made available to the students at that
school and that the school does not discriminate on the basis of race in
administration of its educational policies, admission policies, scholarship
and loan programs, and athletic and other school-administered programs.
Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1972-2 C.B. 230.
In response to the lawsuit, the IRS reviewed its procedures and proposed more
stringent guidelines. 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978) (proposed August 22, 1978). The
IRS proposals raised considerable opposition and debate. In response, the IRS held
public hearings, Proposed IRS Revenue Procedure Affecting Tax-Exemption of Pri-

vate Schools: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 479 (1979), and proposed a revised set of
guidelines, 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451 (1979) (proposed February 12, 1979). IRS action
was subsequently stayed by congressional amendment to the 1980 Treasury Appropriations Act. Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, §§ 103,615,93 Stat. 559, 562, 577 (1979) (known as
the Ashbrook and Dornam amendments). There was no restrictive legislation in
effect when the Supreme Court decided Allen.
3. The parents claimed that, despite IRS policy of denying tax-exempt status to ra-
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harmed them in two ways: first, the mere existence of government financial aid to discriminatory private schools caused the parents to suffer
denigration; second, federal tax-exempt status, when conferred on racially discriminatory private schools in their communities, interfered
with their children's ability to receive an education in desegregated public schools. 4 The district court dismissed the suit, reasoning that the parents lacked standing because they failed to assert a concrete injury.s The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that denigration suffered as a result of governmental
assistance to racially discriminatory schools is an allegation of injury sufficient to confer standing on parents of black schoolchildren. 6 The
Supreme Court reversed and denied the parents standing. 7 The Court
reasoned that whether it regarded the parents' claim of denigration as
either a claim to have the government stop violating the law or as a claim
of stigmatic injury suffered by racial minorities, the injury alleged was
not judicially cognizable. 8 The Court also denied standing premised on
governmental interference with the children's education and held that
although this injury was judicially cognizable, it could not support standing because the injury was not "fairly traceable" to the challenged gov-

4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

cially discriminatory private schools, existing IRS procedures were inadequate to
detect false certifications of nondiscriminatory policies. The parents sought a declaratory judgment that the challenged procedures were unlawful, an injunction requiring that the IRS deny tax-exempt status to a broader class of private schools
than existing procedures provided for, and an order directing the IRS to adopt new
procedures consistent with the requested injunction. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct.
3315, 3319-23 (1984).
Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3319 (1984).
Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790, 794 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Wright v.
Regan, 656 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct.
3315 (1984).
In Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd memo sub nom. Coit V.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), black parents and their school-age children, all residents of Mississippi, secured an order enjoining the IRS from granting tax-exempt
status to racially discriminatory private schools in Mississippi. Simultaneously with
the filing of the Wright action, the plaintiffs in Green filed an action in the same
district court alleging that the IRS was in violation of the court order applicable to
Mississippi. Green V. Simon, No. 1355-69 (D.D.C. July 23, 1976). Six months after
denying the Wright plaintiffs standing, the same judge issued an injunction in favor
of the Green plaintiffs, ordering that the IRS implement guidelines for Mississippi
substantially similar to those requested by the Wright plaintiffs for nationwide implementation. Green V. Miller, No. 13355-69 (D.D.C. May 5, 1980) (clarified and
amended June 2, 1982). The anomalous result of the district court's ruling is that
the IRS now applies two sets of guidelines, one specifically for Mississippi and another for all other states. See Rev. Proc. 75-50, § 8, 1975-2 C.B. 587, 590 (to the
extent the court's order varies from the guidelines, the order is controlling for Mississippi schools). For a complete discussion of the procedural history of the Green
and Wright actions, see Wright V. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 822-26 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
rev'd sub nom. Allen V. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
Wright V. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 827, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub 110m. Allen V.
Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
Allen V. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3324 (1984).
Id. at 3326.
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emmental conduct. 9
A plaintiff without article III standing cannot invoke the power of
the federal courts. \0 To have standing, the plaintiff must be the proper
party to request an adjudication of a particular issue. II At minimum, a
plaintiff must have a personal stake in the outcome of the suit sufficient
to assure concrete adverseness. 12 Before 1970, the test for standing was
whether the plaintiff had suffered injury to a "legally protected interest." \3 In 1970 the Court rejected this test, reasoning that the test improperly required consideration of the merits of the plaintiff's claim. 14 In
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, I 5 the Court
adopted an "injury-in-fact" test for standing. 16 Under this test a wide
variety of grievances have been recognized as allegations of injury-in-fact
constitutionally sufficient to support standing; allegations of economic
10ss,17 interference with social rights,18 or generalized grievances l9 have
been recognized by the Court as adequate bases for standing.
In addition to the injury-in-fact requirement for standing, the
Supreme Court has formulated a separate causation doctrine that must
be satisfied prior to recognition of article III standing. 20 To satisfy the
9. /d.
10. "Those who do not possess Art. III standing may not litigate as suitors in the courts
of the United States." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1982). Article III of the
Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to the adjudication of
"cases" or "controversies." Standing focuses on whether the party initiating the
action has sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to involve the
power of the court on his behalf. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§§ 3-17 to 3-24 (1978).
11. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1978).
12. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
13. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38
(1939) (legal rights protected were those arising out of contract, those protected
against tortious invasion, those involving property, or those founded on a statute
that confers a privilege).
14. Association of Data Processing Servo Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
15. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
16. The Court formulated a two part test; to have standing a party must allege injuryin-fact, and the injury must be within the "zone of interests" protected by a particular statute. Id. at 152-53. There has been little subsequent reference to the "zone of
interests" requirement and its current validity has been questioned. 3 C. WRIGHT,
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13, at 71 n.52 (4th ed. 1983).
17. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970) (tenant farmers have standing to challenge amendment of federal regulation that would cause them economic hardship).
18. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (loss of "social
benefits of living in an integrated community" is sufficient allegation of injury).
19. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (generalized environmental interests are deserving of legal protection). The Sierra Club was denied standing, however, because it did not allege that it or any of its members had suffered injury. Id.
at 735.
20. The Court recognized causation as a requirement for standing in Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). The mother of an illegitimate child was denied
standing to challenge the state's policy of prosecuting only married parents for nonpayment of child support. The Court acknowledged that the mother had been in-
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causation requirement, the plaintiff must allege direct injury to himselP'
fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and likely to be redressed by
the requested relief. 22 There is, however, no fixed standard governing
when these elements of causation are satisfied; hence, application of the
doctrine has been uneven. 23
In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization (EKWRO),24 the Supreme Court used causation analysis to deny indigent
patients standing to challenge IRS grants of tax-exempt status to private
hospitals. 25 The patients claimed that their ability to receive needed
medical care was impaired by IRS policy allowing private hospitals offering only minimal free health care to retain tax-exempt status. 26 The
Court stated that the patients' claimed injury could not be fairly traced
to the challenged IRS action nor was it likely that the injury would be
redressed by use of the Court's remedial powers. 27 The Court noted that
the hospitals could refuse to provide unlimited free medical care for any
number of reasons unrelated to their tax-exempt status. 28 Further, it was
speculative that a court order withdrawing tax-exempt status would facilitate the patients' objective of gaining admission to the hospitals because the hospitals could elect to forego favorable tax treatment to avoid
the financial drain of providing uncompensated services. 29 The Court
dismissed the action because the requisite elements of causation were not
satisfied and, therefore, the patients lacked standing to bring suit. 30
The Supreme Court has often found the causation requirements for
standing satisfied in suits alleging violation of the right of school children
jured by the father's nonpayment, but it held there was insufficient causal
connection between the injury and the alleged discriminatory enforcement of Texas
law. Further, the Court found it unlikely that prosecution of the father would cause
him to pay the support. The statute involved merely provided for incarceration of
the father and, therefore, a court order would not have redressed the mother's injury. Id. at 618. The requirements of direct injury and redressability advanced in
Linda R.S. were used by the Court to create a separate requirement of causation as
a precondition for article III standing. See Leedes, Mr. Justice Powell's Standing, II
U. RICH. L. REV. 269, 287 (1977) ("inability of the Court to give relief . . . can
[become] a problem with constitutional dimensions").
21. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
22. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. (EKWRO), 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 (1976).
23. Compare Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20
(1978) (a substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress the injury is
sufficient to confer standing) with EKWRO, 426 U.S. 26,45 (1976) (to satisfy article
III standing requirements, a plaintiff must show "that, in fact, the asserted injury
was the consequence of the defendants' action, or that prospective relief will remove
the harm"); see also Nichol, Causation as a Stallding Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 Ky. L.J. 185, 186 (1980-81) ("causation decisions,
on the whole, have been characterized by a harsh inconsistency").
24. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
25. !d. at 37.
26. Id. at 42.
27. Id. at 41-43.
28. !d. at 42-43.
29. Id. at 43-46.
30.Id.
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to an integrated education in the public schools. 3 ) In Norwood v. Harrison 32 the Supreme Court recognized a causal connection between a state
program that provided textbooks to all students, including those attending racially discriminatory private schools, and injury to the right of
black students to an integrated education in the public schools. The
Court stated that the government may not provide any aid that tends to
facilitate, reinforce, or support private discrimination. 33 Similarly, in
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery 34 the Court recognized a causal connection between the reservation of public parks for the temporary exclusive
use of racially discriminatory private schools and injury to a student's
right to an integrated education in the public school system. The Court
stated that reservation of public parks for athletic activities significantly
enhanced the attractiveness of the private schools to white parents seeking an alternative to the integrated public schools and violated the city's
constitutional obligation to integrate the public schools. 35 Further, in
Coit v. Green,36 the Supreme Court implicitly recognized the right of
black parents to challenge the adequacy of IRS procedures used to deny
tax exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools. The Court
summarily affirmed the decision of the district court, which ordered the
IRS to implement new and more stringent procedures governing determination of tax-exempt status of private schools in Mississippi.37 Thus,
Norwood,38 Gilmore,39 and Green 4D support the premise that black public
schoolchildren and their parents have standing to challenge governmental action that aids racially discriminatory private schools.
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides that organizations operated exclusively for charitable or educational purposes are exempt from
federal income taxes and contributions to such organizations are deduct i31. The Constitution does not compel the states to provide its residents an education.
See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. I (1972) (education is not within
the limited category of rights guaranteed by the Constitution). Where, however, a
state has undertaken to provide a system of public education, it becomes a property
right which must be available to all on equal terms. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 493 (1954). In Brown the Supreme Court held that states could not segre·
gate children in the public schools on the basis of race. [d. at 495. The Court
extended this prohibition to the federal government in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
The parents in Allen alleged the challenged IRS policy significantly impacted
on the racial composition of the public schools and thus impaired their children's
right to an integrated education in the public schools. 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3321·23
(1984).
32. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
33. [d. at 466.
34. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
35. /d. at 563.
36. 404 U.S. 997, affg memo Green V. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971).
37. [d.
38. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
39. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
40. 404 U.S. 997, affg memo Green V. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971).
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ble from taxable income. 41 The IRS, however, denies tax-exempt status
to private schools failing to show affirmatively that the school has
adopted a "racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students," that such
policy is made known to the general public, and that the school has acted
in accordance with that policy.42
In Bob Jones University v. United States 43 the Supreme Court upheld
the denial by the IRS of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools.44 Bob Jones University had claimed the IRS exceeded its
authority by revoking the school's tax-exempt status because of the
school's racially discriminatory policies. The Court held that private
schools that practice racial discrimination are not entitled to tax-exempt
status under the Code, and that the IRS had not exceeded its authority
by requiring that private schools adopt a racially nondiscriminatory admissions policy as a precondition to recognition of tax-exempt status
under the Code. 45
In Allen v. Wright,46 the Supreme Court denied black parents standing to challenge IRS procedures because of insufficient allegation of injury and failure to satisfy the elements of causation.47 The parents' first
claim, that they and their children suffered denigration when racially discriminatory private schools received tax-exempt status, failed because it
was not a judicially cognizable injury.48 The Court stated that an asserted right to have the government act within the law is not sufficient
basis for standing. 49 Further, stigmatic injury caused by racial discrimination accords standing to only those who are personally injured by the
challenged conduct. 50 Because the parents alleged no previous attempt
to gain, or future interest in gaining, admission for their children to any
of the schools alleged to be racially discriminatory, the parents never
41. The Internal Revenue Code provides that corporations organized for educational
purposes are exempt from federal income taxation. I.R.c. § 501(a), (c)(3) (1982).
The schools are also exempt from federal social security taxes, id. at § 312(b)(8)(B)
(1982), and federal unemployment taxes, id. at § 3306(c)(8) (1982). Contributions
are deductible from gross income, id. at § 170 (1982), and from federal estate and
gift tax, id. at §§ 2055(a)(2), 2522(a)(2) (1982).
42. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
43. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
44. Id. at 596-602.
45. [d.

46.
47.
48.
49.

\04 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
Id. at 3326.
Id. at 3326-27.
Id. The Court in part bases its use of causation analysis to decide the issue of standing on the separation of powers doctrine. See generally Logan, Standing to Sue: A
Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 37 (1984). The Court
maintains that separation of powers constraints placed on the judiciary by the Constitution preclude the recognition of standing to challenge generally programs implemented by the Executive Branch to fulfill its constitutional mandate to execute
the laws. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3329-30 (1984). Thus, the doctrine allows recognition of standing only where the plaintiff seeks to enforce a specific legal
obligation to him, the violation of which works a direct harm. Id.
50. Id. at 3327.
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experienced direct stigmatic injury; therefore, the Court denied standing
premised on denigration suffered. 5J
The parents' second claim of injury was that tax-exempt status for
racially discriminatory private schools impaired their children's ability to
receive a racially integrated education in the public schools. Although
the Court noted that this was a judicially cognizable injury, it denied
standing because the alleged injury was not fairly traceable to the challenged IRS procedures. 52 The Court stated that the parents had failed to
show that existing IRS procedures allowed a sufficient number of racially
discriminatory schools to receive improperly tax-exempt status for withdrawal of those exemptions to make an appreciable difference in the integration of the public schools. 53 Further, it was speculative that a court
order mandating implementation of new procedures would cause either
the private schools or white parents to alter their behavior in a manner
that would significantly affect the racial composition of the public
schools. 54 The Court reasoned that the black parents lacked standing to
bring suit because the parents' allegations of injury to their children's
ability to receive an integrated education could not be fairly traced to the
challenged IRS action and the injury was not likely to be redressed by
the requested relief. 55
Two Justices dissented from the Court's opinion in Allen.56 Neither
recognized the plaintiffs' claim of denigration caused by governmental
action as a constitutionally sufficient allegation of injury.57 Rather, both
dissenting Justices found that the parents had satisfied the traceability
and redressability components of the causation doctrine. 58 The dissenting
Justices maintained that the parents should be granted standing to challenge IRS procedures alleged to interfere with their children's right to an
integrated education in the public schools. 59
51. Id.
52. Id. at 3328.
53. Id. at 3328-29.
54. Id. at 3329.
55. Id. at 3329-30.
56. Id. at 3333-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 3342-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Justice Brennan concluded that the alleged injury to the children'S right to an integrated public education was sufficient to satisfy article III standing requirements
and, therefore, it was not necessary to reach the issue of stigmatic injury. Allen v.
Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3335 n.3 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
stated that the alleged injury to the children's right to an integrated education in the
public schools was an adequate allegation of injury-in-fact and he did not discuss the
issue of stigmatic injury. /d. at 3342 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3335-37 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 3342, 3345 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
59. Justice Brennan noted that in the analogous context of housing discrimination, denial of the right to live in an integrated community is sufficient injury to satisfy
constitutional standing requirements and there was no rational basis for treating
schoolchildren differently from residents. 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3336 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see supra note 18 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens argued that
separation of powers should be considered under a distinct justiciability analysis and
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Prior to the Court's decision in Allen v. Wright,60 Supreme Court
precedent as to whether black citizens have standing to challenge government action alleged to be in denigration of their race was divided. In
Norwood v. Harrison,61 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery,62 and Coit v.
Green,63 the standing of black citizens was premised on the government's
obligation to refrain from giving any aid or support that tends to facilitate or reinforce private discrimination. 64 These cases support recognition of the black parents' right to challenge IRS procedures alleged to
denigrate their position as members of their communities. 65 Under EKWRO,66 however, stigmatic injury would be judicially cognizable only if
the parents identified some concrete injury which would be redressed by
the requested relief in order to independently satisfy the causation requirement of article III standing. 67 Thus, standing would be denied unless the black parents could show a direct causal relationship between
their claimed injuries and the challenged IRS grants of tax-exempt status
to the private schools. 68
In Allen v. Wright,69 the Supreme Court denied standing70 'on the
basis of EKWRO.71 The Court characterized the parents' allegations of
injury in broad terms 72 even though the parents had limited their claim
of injury to denigration they and their children had personally suffered as
a result of IRS grants of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

65.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

that considerations of tax policy, economics, and pure logic required recognition of
standing by the Court. Id. at 3345 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
413 U.S. 455 (1973).
417 U.S. 556 (1974).
404 U.S. 997, affg memo Green V. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971).
Allen V. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3339 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Norwood
explicitly stands for the proposition that governmental aid to racially discriminatory
schools is a direct impediment to school desegregation"); see supra notes 31-40 and
accompanying text.
See Bob Jones University V. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); McCoy & Devins,
Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax Exemptions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 441, 447-48 (1984) (standing based on denigration of race implicitly accepted by the Supreme Court in Norwood V. Harrison). See
generally Note, The Judicial Role in Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 93 HARV. L. REV. 378, 385-86 (1979) (the Supreme Court
implied in Norwood V. Harrison that parents of children attending public schools
could challenge any "tangible assistance" given to discriminatory schools by the
government).
426 U.S. 26 (1976).
Allen V. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3328 n.22 (1984); see supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315,3326 n.19 (1984).
104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
!d. at 3326.
426 U.S. 26 (1976).
104 S. Ct. 3315, 3327 (1984) (recognition of the parents' standing on their claim of
injury would mean that a black person in Hawaii could challenge the tax-exempt
status of a discriminatory school in Maine).
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schools in their communities. 73 Further, unlike the plaintiffs in EKWRO,74 the parents did not seek admission of their children to a private
institution. Rather, they wanted the IRS to implement effective procedures to identify racially discriminatory schools in their communities
and deny them tax-exempt status. Contrary to the majority's contention,75 the relief sought, unlike that in EKWRO,76 was not dependent on
the actions of outside parties. The tax benefits received by the racially
discriminatory schools would cease upon withdrawal of tax-exempt status. Thus, any interference with the children's right to an integrated education in the public schools caused by federal tax policy would be
eliminated by a court order withdrawing tax-exempt status for the
schools. 77 By characterizing the nexus between the government's conduct and desegregation of the public schools as "attenuated, "7S the Court
denied standing on causation grounds without first determining whether
the black parents have a substantive right to demand that their government refrain from giving aid to racially discriminatory private schools in
their communities. 79
The Supreme Court has been criticized for using the causation doctrine as a thin disguise for its opinion on the merits of the underlying
claim. so The Supreme Court's denial of standing in Allen v. Wright Sl is
evidence that the Court does not want to involve itself in controversies
concerning tax-exempt status for segregated private schools beyond its
decision in Bob Jones University v. United States S2 that those private
73. [d. at 3335 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the parents limit their claim of stigmatic
injury to that caused by illegal grants of tax-exempt status by the IRS to racially
discriminatory schools located in their communities where the public schools are
currently desegregating).
74. 426 U.S. 26 (1976); see supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
75. 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3328-29 (1984).
76. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
77. 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3342-45 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the parents' injury will be
redressed if the discriminatory schools' operations are inhibited through denial of
tax-exempt status); Note, supra note 65, at 386 n.4O (implementation of effective
procedures wi1l remedy unconstitutional governmental support of private
discrimination).
78. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3328 (1984).
79. !d. at 3333 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the Court denies the parents' standing "without acknowledging the precise nature of the injuries they have alleged"); see also
Logan, supra note 49, at 53 ("[I]t is illogical to evaluate any claim made by a party
without reference to the nature of the right asserted, and by so doing, the Court
makes a constitutional decision regarding standing in an analytic vacuum.").
80. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3341 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also
Chayes, Forward: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1,
14-22 (1982) (the Court "stack[s] the deck" by its characterization of the injury-infact that the plaintiff asserts); Nichol, supra note 23, at 186 ("The tests employed are
too easily manipulated to coincide with the desire, or lack thereof, to reach the
merits of particular cases. "); Tushnet, The New Law Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 663, 663 (1977) ("Decisions on questions of standing
are concealed decisions on the merits of the underlying constitutional claim.").
8\. 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
82. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). Justice Powell stated that it was for Congress to make the
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schools discriminating on the basis of race are ineligible for tax-exempt
status under the Code. In Bob Jones University 83 the Court stressed that
the IRS had primary responsibility for construing the Code and that
Congress had vested the IRS with broad authority to formulate procedures for its implementation. 84 By denying the black parents standing to
challenge IRS procedures designed to limit tax-exempt status to nondiscriminatory private schools, the Court leaves to Congress and the Executive the task of articulating policy on tax-exemptions for discriminatory
organizations.
Susan D. Cobun

legislative policy choices as to tax-exemptions for discriminatory organizations and
that public policy should not be determined by judges. [d. at 611-12 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See also McCoy & Devins,
supra note 65, at 443-44.
83. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
84. [d. at 596.

